This paper analyzes equity carve-outs by exchange-listed German firms. We rely on the fact that carve-outs always change the governance structure of the conducting firm to study issues of corporate control.
Introduction
If a firm sells a subsidiary to the public via an IPO this is called an equity carve-out. Carve-outs can be interpreted either as an instrument to raise funds, or as a way to restructure the firm. There are two issues that render them particularly interesting from a corporate control perspective. First, carve-outs are mainly conducted by large conglomerate firms, where agency problems due to the separation of ownership and control are expected to be severe. Second, a carve-out is an event where a firm's management raises funds at the expense of control rights in the subsidiary. Hence, carve-outs always lead to a change in the governance structure and a market evaluation of this change can be observed.
As argued by Allen and McConnell (1998) , although the parent often still holds significant stakes in the subsidiary after the IPO, management of the parent has lost significant control rights: The newly listed subsidiary has its own board of directors, is subject to disclosure requirements, and is directly subject to the mechanisms of the market for corporate control. They further argue that managerial control over discretionary capital will be reflected in the announcement effect of a carve-out and provide some consistent evidence.
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In this paper, we adopt the view that agency problems like managerial discretion will be reflected in the market value adjustments following carve-out announcements. Our primary conjecture is that the degree by which managerial discretion affects abnormal returns of carve-outs depends crucially on the preevent control structure of the conglomerate firm. The underlying idea is simple: the more the management of a conglomerate firm is subject to control by a governance institution (in particular controlling shareholders, supervisory boards, and banks), the lower should be value gains from the change in the control structure associated with a carve-out.
1 Similar in spirit, Gertner, Powers, and Scharfstein (2000) use announcements of spin-offs to assess the market (re-)valuation of associated changes to the size and efficiency of internal capital markets. Again, managerial discretion, and agency problems between divisional managers are the essential underlying problems.
To illustrate, suppose there are two firms going for a carve-out. One firm's management is subject to strong control and therefore the firm is efficiently managed, while the other firm's management is loosely controlled and therefore the firm is inefficiently managed. Given that the carve-out always leads to a change in the governance structure of the subsidiary, any change that improves management control will be most valuable for the less efficient firm. Hence abnormal returns should be higher, the less firm management is disciplined by governance institutions before the carve-out.
It is noteworthy that the change in the governance structure may not only affect the subsidiary. Loosing control over funds of the subsidiary might be reflected in the internal capital market of the conglomerate firm as well. If this, for example, leads to a reduction in free cash-flow available to the parent's management, a carve-out might also increase the value of the parent firm. Again, this effect should be more pronounced the weaker control over management before the event.
However, an alternative prediction on the impact of management control would be that tighter control of management ensures a more efficient use of proceeds generated by the carve-out. The implied impact on abnormal returns would be exactly the other way around: firms with controlling shareholders should have higher abnormal returns.
Hence it is ultimately an empirical question as to whether the degree of management control matters, and what the impact will be. The objective of this paper is to test the conjecture of the impact of pre-event management control on carve-out announcement returns. To this end, we analyze the ownership structure as well as the degree of bank influence rights (i.e. two allegedly major institutions of corporate governance) as potential determinants of abnormal returns of carve-outs.
The analysis is based on all carve-outs over the period from 1984 to mid 2000 conducted by German exchange-listed firms. Using a firm sample from Germany is interesting in the context of an analysis of corporate control issues because the German financial system -as the prototype of bank-based financial systems like in Japan and many other countries in Europe -offers a wide array of different ownership structures and governance institutions. As pointed out for example by Edwards and Fischer (1994) , corporate control of large exchangelisted firms in Germany is based on inter-and intra-industry blockholdings and a strong monitoring role of banks by debt financing, direct equity holdings, proxyvotes, and representation in the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat). Therefore, the German financial system is a unique place to learn about corporate control and the role of banks therein. Our study will explicitly take all of the aforementioned instruments of bank control into account, thereby addressing the question for why banks are "special" (Fama 1985 ) and why they have such a prominent role in firm financing around the world.
Similar to Allen and McConnell (1998) , we assume that i) managers might be interested in non-shareholder value maximizing activities like "empire-building".
ii) We believe that changes in the governance structure are not the primary motivation for carve-outs, but they are inevitably associated. Indeed, previous studies show that carve-outs are associated with positive abnormal returns, driven by at least three issues: increased corporate focus, decreased informational opacity, and managerial discretion. It is in particular the latter finding supporting our conjecture that corporate control issues might well explain some of these effects (see also Allen and McConnell (1998) and Vijh (1999) ).
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Until mid of 2000, roughly 50 carve-outs occurred in Germany. This small sample size could be seen as a caveat to our analysis. But a small sample size also offers the opportunity to collect and use data otherwise not available (or prohibitively costly) for large scale samples. We exploit this advantage in particular by collecting information on proxy-votes of banks which are hard and only manually to obtain. Further, to avoid any biases due to the small sample size 2 Note that the positive announcement effect of a carve-out stands in marked contrast to market reactions to the announcement of similar financing instruments of firms (e.g. SEOs, which lead to highly negative abnormal returns)
problem, we conduct bootstrap based robustness tests. Second, and most importantly, we find that a higher degree of shareholder concentration, or the existence of an ultimate owner, before the event leads to significantly lower abnormal returns. This supports that changes in the governance structure due to a carve-out affect firm value. Moreover, the finding is consistent with the idea that value gains are lower if less efficiency gains are to be expected ex ante. Finally, we do not find evidence for a "special" role of banks in management control, although we examine explicitly all means of banks to exert influence on management: debt provision, direct equity stakes, proxyvoting rights, and supervisory board representation. That is, universal banks in Germany exert management control via direct shareholdings, but the degree of control does not go beyond control exerted by non-financial shareholders.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly describe the characteristics of the German system of corporate control, thereby identifying the major governance institutions to be included in our analysis. Section 3 describes our data, and presents the univariate analysis of announcement effects. Section 4 is the core of the analysis and reports cross-sectional regressions testing our governance conjecture. Section 5 reports robustness tests based on bootstrap simulations to control for the small sample size and related problems of heteroscedasticity and event-clustering. Section 6 summarizes and concludes. . A carve-out transfers control of the subsidiary from the parent's management to the capital market. As a result, the subsidiary becomes directly subject to the market for corporate control. While Allen and McConnell (1998) and Vijh (1999) have shown that managerial discretion affects the market valuation of carve-outs in the US, our study extends the analysis to the shift in management control from inside firm mechanisms to capital markets.
Within such an empirical analysis several potential ways to exert management control have to be differentiated. Especially for German firms, the bank-based financial system and the ownership structure of large firms give rise to specific determinants, i.e. monitoring by banks, monitoring by blockholders, and ultimate ownership of firms in the context of pyramids and cross-holdings.
We consider first control by blockholders. It is useful to start with a brief description of the governing bodies of a German exchange-listed corporation (Aktiengesellschaft, AG). The AG has three governing bodies: the annual general meeting (Hauptversammlung), a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) and a managing board (Vorstand ). The supervisory board and the managing board are personally separated. The supervisory board must have a pre-specified number of employee representatives as members (co-determination, Mitbestimmung). It is common that boards of affiliated firms share members, for example, typically some managers of the parent are member of a subsidiary's supervisory board.
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Additionally, it is also common for large firms that the supervisory board includes representatives of a firm's banks, which then usually have a tradition of 5 See Boehmer (1999) for a more detailed overview and references.
debt provision and may have equity stakes in the firm.
Shareholders elect the supervisory board; their control rights are exercised at the general meeting. Unlike the US, it is common in Germany (and Western Europe in general, see Faccio and Lang (2002) ) that there are significant blockholdings. Franks and Mayer (2000) and Boehmer (2000) provide evidence that over the period 1985 to 1997 roughly 85% of all listed German firms have a blockholder with a stake above 25%, and 57% one with a stake above 50%.
These blockholders are from the financial sector but more often from the same or different industries.
This description highlights the fact that management control by "inside equity" may be an important issue for our analysis of carve-outs. With blockholders, free-rider problems are less relevant. This provides for stronger incentives to monitor management, rendering managerial discretion less likely to be a systematic source of efficiency losses.
To proxy ownership concentration, we collect data on equity holdings (voting rights) before the event date for each firm of our sample. The data is based on mandatory disclosures of firms (for stakes above 5%). Since before 1995 the mandatory minimum level for disclosure was only 25% we use additional sources to assess ownership structures for events before 1995. 6 The available lists of capital attendance at general meetings (see below) were used to cross-check our information on blockholdings. This robustness test indicates a high quality of our data.
Using this information, we construct a Herfindahl-index measuring concentration of voting rights. The Herfindahl-index is defined as the sum of squares of the blockholding fractions of each blockholder and takes values between 0 (perfect dispersion) and 1 (fully concentrated). This variable is labeled CONCENT.
6 Used sources on voting rights were several issues of the handbooks Hoppenstedt/Saling Aktienführer, Wer gehört zu wem edited by Commerzbank AG, the filings list of the regulatory authority (Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel ) and finally information from the IPO prospectuses or annual reports of firms.
Pyramids and Ultimate Ownership
In the context of German large firms, complex ownership structures such as pyramids with several layers of ownership and cross-ownership between firms have to be taken into account (see La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) ,
Boehmer (2000)). There is evidence that these pyramids are a frequent phenomenon for large German firms (see Boehmer (2000) , Franks and Mayer (2000) ).
Hence, it might not be sufficient to look only at direct ownership structures. The question which shareholder ultimately controls a firm needs to be considered as well.
To identify the ultimate owner of a sample firm, we trace controlling share- 
Corporate Control by Banks
With respect to the role of banks, the issue of "inside debt" as a monitor of management becomes relevant. 10 By taking a first look at the indebtedness of large firms, one may conclude that bank influence is not much of an issue because these numbers often are below 20% (for our sample it equals 16%, see below). An irrelevance conclusion would be premature, however. Recent theoretical work by Holmström and Tirole (1997) suggests that only an incentive-compatible amount of bank loans is required to establish diligent bank monitoring, implying that even a small proportion of bank debt may have on the margin significant effects on management behavior. In addition, it has to be taken into account that bank debt is just one means for banks to exert management control.
Especially in the context of large firms in Germany, direct shareholdings, supervisory board representation, and proxy-votes by banks are all eminent alternatives. We will provide descriptive statistics in Section 4.3.2, but we can state in advance that banks have significant influence rights on firm management for our sample. Apparently, one prominent reason for this is due to the fact that deviations from share ownership and voting rights (i.e. control) occur easily under German law. The German proxy-voting system allows shareholders to deposit their shares with banks, and grant them general power of attorney. The resulting additional voting power for the banks is presumed to be significant. For example, Baums and Fraune (1995) provide evidence on large German firms with a dispersed ownership structure in 1992. In their sample, banks have on average 13% of effective voting rights at the general meeting due to direct equity holdings and 61% due to proxy-votes. Hence, if banks have mutual interest and act in coordination, their influence on management is potentially tremendous and can not be ignored within the context of our study. However, evidence on proxy-voting by banks is scarce since the data is not accessible in a centralized (or even electronic)
way. 11 As will be discussed in more detail later on, we were able to collect this information for 73% of our sample firms.
We use three variables to control for management influence of banks. The first is BANKDEBT, the share of bank debt in total assets of firms. The second is EQBANK, a binary variable taking the value of one if at least one bank directly holds equity of a firm, and zero else. Finally, PROXY denotes the sum of proxy voting rights of all banks at the general meeting of the parent preceding the carve-out announcement.
3 Data Set, Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis
Sample Selection and Data
We use several sources to identify the sample of carve-outs. Identification is primarily based on a keyword search in the Lexis/Nexis-database, augmented by information taken from the Hoppenstedt IPO-list and additional resources.
In addition, the sample is matched with all previous studies on German carveouts. Our observation period ends in mid of 2000, since after the end of the new-technology boom the IPO market in Germany has been drastically slowed.
The primary selection criterion is that the parent is a German exchange-listed corporation with an equity stake in the subsidiary above 50% before the carveout. Further it is mandated for the subsidiary not to be exchange-listed before the IPO of the carve-out. Finally, stock-price data has to be available for the parent either in the Datastream database or the scientific stock price database at the University of Karlsruhe.
This process identified 48 carve-outs from 1984 to June 2000. There was one case where a single parent (Löwenbräu AG) issued three subsidiaries at the same 11 Exercised proxy-votes are documented publicly. However, there does not exist a centralized register or an electronic database for assessing this information, see Boehmer (1999) . One has to address the local inferior counts at the registered seat of the firms to examine the mandatory minutes of the general meetings.
day. We treat this as one observation, reducing the sample to 46 events.
The identified events are quite dispersed over our observation period before 1998. The number of carve-outs increases dramatically from then on, which can be attributed to the large increase of IPOs in Germany due to the invention of Germany's stock-market segment for young and innovative growth firms (Neuer Markt) in 1997.
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For two events, we were not able to find a precise announcement date in the Lexis/Nexis-Database. Inspection of the available data leads to a further decrease in the sample due to infrequent trading of the respective stocks. Infrequent trading during the estimation period of an event study can be overcome by diverse procedures.
13 Unfortunately, no countermeasure is available if the problem occurs excessively around or even at the event date. In our data set, 5 stocks exist with more than 50% of zero returns in a [-20,+20] window around (or even at) the event day.
14 In addition, with respect to the cross-sectional analysis, we must drop further two observations which are carve-outs from parents of the financial sector.
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We dispense with these observations which leads to our sample consisting of 37 observations of carve-out announcements. This is the final sample used for the cross-sectional analysis in Section 4.3.
As outlined in the preceding section, management influence by banks is presumably significant for large German firms, especially due to the proxy-voting
12 Following the invention of Neuer Markt, from 1997 to the end of 2000 approximately 300
IPOs occurred only in this market segment. The extent of this increase becomes clear when noting that from 1949 to 1996 a total of only 356 companies went public in Germany, see Franzke (2001) and Stehle and Erhardt (1999) for more details.
13 The usual alternatives are estimating adjusted betas following the approaches of Scholes and Williams (1977) or Dimson (1979) . A simple alternative is using only market adjusted abnormal returns.
system. To control for this effect, we collected the mandatory minutes of the general meetings of our sample at the year (or alternatively the year before) the event, which contain an attendance list of capital and explicitly indicate proxyvotes. Not all local inferior counts in charge at the registered seat of the firms responded to our request; sometimes the documents were not available anymore.
In total, we were able to collect information for 27 observations of our sample of 37 carve-outs (73%). These cases constitute a sub-sample that allows to assess the importance of proxy voting rights in Section 4.3.2.
Descriptive Statistics
Before turning to the univariate analysis of announcement effects in the next subsection, we will provide a brief description of German firms undertaking a carve-out in the period from 1984 to mid 2000, i.e., our sample period. Balance sheet information are from the Hoppenstedt balance sheet database, equity holdings of the parent are collected from the registration statement filings of the IPOs.
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As shown in Table 1 , the parent firms in our sample are large firms with an average annual turnover of 10,783 million Euro (Size). The ratio of turnover of the subsidiary to turnover of the parent before the event (Size Ratio) is on average 21.1% with a median of 16.3%. With respect to financial characteristics, the average firm is profitable with returns on assets of 5.2% (Profit) and a standard deviation of 8.1%. The firms' debt ratio (excluding internal financing from reserves) is on average about 45% of total assets.
Finally, firms significantly reduce their equity holdings via the carve-out: Average holdings before the carve-out are roughly 94% with a median of 100%, afterwards these numbers decrease to roughly 57% on average with a median of 64%. In comparison, Allen and McConnell (1998) report average holdings after the event to be 69% with a median of 80% for US-carve-outs.
16 Reported financial ratios etc. are based on the annual statements of the year before the event. 
Univariate Analysis of Announcement Effects
For the univariate analysis of carve-out announcements effects, we follow closely the design of Brown and Warner (1985) . Thus -speaking in event time around the announcement date identified by the Lexis/Nexis-search -we estimate a market model for all firms based on the pre-event estimation period [-250, -51] . This leads to estimates of pre-event α's and β's (the systematic risk) used to calculate "normal" returns for each firm. 17 Abnormal returns for any given point in time and firm are simply the difference between realized and normal returns. The latter are based on the contemporaneous return of the market portfolio and the estimated parameters. As a robustness test, we also calculated simple market adjusted abnormal returns.
Following Brown and Warner (1985) , inference is based on the standard deviation of the residuals from the market model regressions. To test for robustness, we further test significance of average AR/CAR using the cross-sectional standard deviation and a non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test.
All calculations are done for the full sample defined in the preceding section 17 We use the value-weighted performance index CDAX as the proxy for the market portfolio.
as well as the smaller sample for which data on bank proxy-votes is available. For ease of exposition, we do not report all of the robustness tests since the results are qualitatively identical throughout.
In Figure 1 , a plot of cumulated average abnormal returns for the time period [-20,+20] in event time is depicted. Calculations are based on the full sample of 37 events. Obviously, the announcement of carve-outs conveys a significant proportion of useful information for the market valuation of firms: Beginning roughly 5 days before the event day, the figure shows a dramatic increase in cumulated average abnormal returns.
Figure 1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Plot of cumulative abnormal returns for carve-out announcements from event day -20 to +20. The abnormal returns are based on the full sample of 37 carve-out announcements. This graphical result is confirmed by our significance tests shown in Table   2 . There's a highly significant and positive average abnormal return of about 1.1% at the event day. This is confirmed by the non-parametric analysis with a median of 0.5% and a p-value of 0.04. As indicated by Figure 1 , information processing and market revaluation happen before and after the event day: The average CAR in the intervals [-5,+5] and [-10,+10] are higher than at day zero and highly significant. The CAR [-5,+5 ] is 3.9% on average. For a longer event window of 20 days around the event day, the CAR remains constant. These numbers imply to use [-5,+5]-CAR for the cross-sectional analysis, since during this time period the major part of information processing and revaluation seems to occur.
In summary, we find a very robust and positive market revaluation of firms announcing a carve-out of a subsidiary. The positive effect for German carve-outs is similar to the international evidence.
We now turn to the core of our analysis: The analysis of cross-sectional determinants of announcement effects focused on issues of corporate control.
Determinants of Abnormal Returns

Empirical Design
The empirical design to test our hypotheses on management control by inside equity and inside debt consists of running a cross-sectional regression of CAR on a set of explanatory variables. The general model is described by equation 1.
Hence, to test our hypothesis, we include the variables CONCENT and UL-TIMATE to reflect ownership structures in the cross section. Bank dependence is measured either by BANKDEBT, EQBANKS, or PROXY, our measures of the proportion of bank debt in total firm financing, the indicator variable whether banks hold direct equity stakes, and voting rights by banks due to proxy-voting, respectively.
With respect to inside equity, our management control conjecture implies that a higher degree of voting rights concentration before the carve-out, or the existence of an ultimate owner, decreases the announcement effect of carve-outs.
Similarly, with respect to inside debt, a higher degree of bank control before the carve-out should decrease the announcement effect of carve-outs. The underlying idea of both hypotheses is that the higher management control before the event, the less efficiency gains are to be expected from the induced changes in the governance structure by the carve-out. Hence, we expect to find a negative coefficient for all measures of ownership structure and bank-dependence.
Under the alternative hypothesis that a higher degree of corporate control leads to a more efficient usage of carve-out proceeds, the aforementioned variables should have a positive coefficient. In addition, the intended usage of carveout proceeds should affect announcement effects due to problems of managerial discretion (see Allen and McConnell (1998) Control variables comprise in particular measures for the main determinants of carve-out abnormal returns known from the literature. We do include these 18 In a primary placement the carve-out is conducted by an equity issuance of the subsidiary to the public without participation of the parent.
measures to avoid omitted variables biases, our focus is on issues of corporate control, however.
Previous studies on carve-outs have established that (at least for US firms)
positive announcement effects can be explained by i) the elimination of negative synergies, ii) decreases in informational opacity of firms, iii) and managerial discretion.
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Following the literature, we include in our cross-sectional regressions two regressors with respect to synergies and opaqueness. We define a dummy variable, INDUSTRY, which equals one if parent and subsidiary belong to the same industry and zero if not. 20 The dummy is expected to have a negative sign, since it measures the mean difference to the reference group of parent and subsidiary belonging to different industries, where the existence of negative synergies is more likely (see Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) for spin-offs and Vijh (2002) for carve-outs using a similar design).
A carve-out may mitigate informational opacity of firms since the separation of the conglomerate leads to smaller reporting entities with less opportunities for internal compensation and window-dressing. Thus, for both, parent and subsidiary, a given level of information becomes more precise. Further, the subsidiary will provide additional information because it is subject to new disclosure requirements on its own. Again closely following the literature, to control for informational opaqueness we include a regressor reflecting the degree of capital market uncertainty about the quality and value perspectives of the pre-event firm. This proxy is defined as the standard deviation of the market model regression residuals of the estimation period, thus reflecting the idiosyncratic risk component of the firm before the event. This variable is labeled OPAQUE. We discuss the robustness of this measure in Section 5, where we use the dispersion 19 Schipper and Smith (1986) also suggest a carve-out allows to implement more efficient incentive-compatible compensation schemes for the subsidiary's managers. 20 The identification of the industry affiliation is based on the two-digit SIC-code of all main industries of the firms reported in the Hoppenstedt-database. To reduce inconsistencies from the SIC-classification, we double-checked all cases individually.
of analysts forecasts as an alternative measure of informational opacity.
If the separation of parent and subsidiary leads to more informational transparency a positive coefficient of OPAQUE is expected since transparency is more valuable for opaque firms.
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Finally, we include the ratio of sales of the subsidiary to sales of the parent as regressor, labeled SIZE RATIO. This serves to control for the effect that relatively smaller subsidiaries may lead to smaller announcement effects because they contribute less to the overall value of the conglomerate firm. Table 3 lists labels, definitions and expected coefficient signs of all regressors. Table 4 provides some descriptive statistics for the aforementioned regressors.
Complementary Descriptive Statistics
With respect to the allocation of the IPO proceeds, in 41% of our sample the parent did not receive funds directly (NOFIN). The degree of voting rights concentration (CONCENT) is on average 0.16 with a standard deviation of 0.17 and a maximum observation of 0.55. To provide some feeling for these numbers, suppose a firm has two blockholders, each with an equity stake of 30% (the remainder shares are dispersed). This implies a Herfindahl-index of 0.18 (2·0.3 2 ).
Hence, as expected, blockholdings are a frequent phenomenon in our sample. This is also supported by the observation that 59% of the sample firms have an ultimate owner.
In 43% of the events, parent and subsidiary belong to different industries, constituting the sub-sample of cases with a high potential for eliminating negative synergies (INDUSTRY).
Finally, though not reported in the The alternative hypothesis on the impact of the degree of management control is that abnormal returns increase in tighter control of management because carve-out proceeds will be used more efficiently. This interpretation is primarily based on access to and usage of funds. The negative coefficient of both ownership measures clearly contradict this hypothesis. Furthermore, according to Model II, whether or not the parent's management has direct access to the proceeds is irrelevant since NOFIN is insignificant. As a final test of the alternative hypothesis, we reestimate Model III augmented by an interaction term between NOFIN and CONCENT. Again, the corresponding regression (Model V) shows that a more concentrated ownership structure decreases abnormal returns. However, the interaction term controlling for direct access to funds is insignificant.
Cross-Sectional Results
Baseline Results and Ownership Structure
Overall, the strong impact of the ownership structure is consistent with the interpretation that for firms with a lower pre-event degree of management control more efficiency gains are expected.
To summarize our first set of results, we find suggestive evidence for a disciplining role of blockholders on management, since abnormal returns of carve-out announcements decrease -all else equal -in the degree of shareholder concentration. In the next subsection, we test whether banks are special as a monitor of management. Table 3 . Values in parentheses are White (1980) 
heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. N is the number of observations, p-value F-test
reports an F-test of a reduced model (only constant). *, **, ***: significance at the 10%-, 5%-and 1%-level, respectively. The characteristics of the bank-based German financial system imply that banks may be pivotal in exerting management control for large German firms. In this section we will examine this issue by extending our empirical model accordingly.
Regressors
As mentioned before, four mechanisms for banks to exert influence on firm management can be distinguished: i) bank debt, ii) direct equity stakes of the bank, iii) proxy-votes, and iv) supervisory board representation of the bank. Table 7 provides some descriptive statistics for each of these mechanisms for our sample. Table 7 supports the importance of banks as financiers and investors of our sample firms. Bank debt accounts on average for 16.5% of total firm financing (BANKDEBT). Moreover, according to the mean value of the dummy EQBANK, banks hold direct equity stakes in our sample firms in 31% of the cases.
The variable PROXY measures proxy-votes of banks at general meetings in the year preceding the carve-out announcement (aggregated over all banks). As can be seen from Table 7 , proxy votes are quantitatively the dominant source of voting rights, because overall voting right of banks are on average 54% and proxy votes account for 44% percentage points of this number.
However, proxy-voting rights reflect to some degree the dispersion of a firms shareholder structure. 22 This is reflected in the strong negative correlation between PROXY and the Herfindahl-index CONCENT with a correlation coefficient of -0.64 (not reported in the table) .
Finally, the table shows the percentage of cases where a bank representative (typically a member of the banks management board) is member of the supervisory board of the parent firm. This is the case in about 87% of the observations and hence virtually for all firms. Therefore, we use this information only for descriptive purposes.
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Whether banks use their potential influence to exert management control will be tested by using measures of bank dependence as regressors, augmenting the cross-sectional analysis of abnormal returns from the previous section.
We rerun the regression of [-5,+5]-CAR of Model III and IV reported in Table   6 and include an interaction effect between our ownership proxies and a measure for the degree of bank dependence. Under the inside debt hypothesis we should find that banks exert at least the same degree of management control as non-bank blockholders. In this case, the coefficient of the interaction should be insignificant or significantly negative. If banks are really "special" as monitors of management (see for example Fama (1985) , Gorton and Schmid (2000) ), i.e. exert management control beyond what non-bank blockholders achieve, then the interaction should be significantly negative. If bank dependence contradicts management control by non-bank blockholders, the interaction effect should have a significantly positive coefficient.
In Model VI of Table 8 , we measure bank dependence by the relative importance of bank debt for total firm financing (BANKDEBT) and management control by ownership concentration (CONCENT). As in Model III, the impact of a higher pre-event ownership concentration (CONCENT) is significantly neg-22 Blockholders are not expected to systematically delegate their voting rights to banks, but small private shareholders -facing high fixed costs of exerting minor control rights -will probably do so. [-5 ,+5] on a set of explanatory variables. All models extend the baseline Model I (see Table 6 ); the corresponding coefficients are qualitatively unchanged in terms of signs and significance and therefore omitted. Model VI, VII and VIII are based on the full sample, Model IX relies on observations where data on bank proxy-votes was available. For variable definitions see Table 3 . Values in parentheses are White (1980) Table 8 To summarize, our analysis of the role of banks in management control leads to two insights: First, we do find evidence that blockholders exert control over management. Second, our evidence suggest that management control by banks does not go beyond what non-financial blockholders achieve. Finally, the evidence is also not consistent with an inside debt hypothesis in the sense that banks use proxy-votes in mutual interest and in coordination. That is, our results do not imply that proxy-votes are a means for management control.
24 Note that the adjusted R 2 remains high for Model IX.
Robustness
Heteroscedasticity and Event-Clustering
The preceding discussion implicitly assumed the absence of severe specification and data problems. However, this might not hold for three reasons:
• The homoscedastictiy assumption of OLS.
• Clustering of events in calendar time.
• The small sample size of only 37 (27) observations.
It is in particular the small sample size problem which renders all of these potential problems highly relevant for our analysis. Inference in the last section was based on White (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors of the coefficients. Unfortunately, the White-correction -though asymptotically consistent -is rather well known for its small-sample bias, leading to too many type-I errors. Since there is no reason to expect homoscedasticity of abnormal returns, this is a potentially severe problem in our context.
Moreover, although we have only few event observations over a rather long time period, there is some event-clustering in our sample. If this problem is too severe, the resulting correlation structure of the CAR might lead to biased inferences since the distributional assumptions for the abnormal returns is misspecified (MacKinlay (1997)). We define a cluster to be a group of events with overlapping windows around the respective event dates in the interval [-20,+20] .
In general there are m clusters within the n observations with m ≤ n. Hence the smallest cluster size is 1.
25
The natural solution in this context is to base inference on non-parametric bootstrap standard errors rather than asymptotic theory. Two properties of the bootstrap procedure are particularly useful for our analysis. First, bootstrapping 25 In fact, there are 7 clusters containing more than one event in the full sample: four with only 2, two with 3 and one with 4 events.
does not require distributional assumptions and is robust to heteroscedasticity.
Second, the bootstrap procedure can be adjusted to account for event-clustering.
We discuss the details of the applied bootstrap-t-procedure in Appendix A.
Robust Cross-Sectional Regressions
The bootstrap procedure results in confidence intervals for regression coefficients of Table 6 and 8. The significance test is to check whether the zero is element of the confidence interval. The results are shown in Table 9 , where confidence intervals are based on 10,000 bootstrap-t simulation runs.
26 It provides the coefficients from OLS (based on Table 6 and 8) as well as estimated confidence intervals from the bootstrap-t-procedure. For ease of exposition, we focus on CONCENT as the measure of ownership 26 We also estimated bootstrap-t standard errors without calendar time clustering adjustments. The results are virtually identical.
concentration and EQBANK as the measure of bank dependence. Consequently, we report robust regressions for Models I, III, VII. Notably, however, robust inference for the other models would not affect the results of the previous sections.
As shown in Table 9 , robust inference for all models confirms our findings regarding focus improvement and informational opaqueness. Most importantly, bootstrap based inference does also not change any of the results with respect to the significant impact of blockholder control as well as the role of banks. Robust inference for Model III and VII shows that the coefficient of CONCENT remains significantly negative. Modell VII still indicates no effect of bank control beyond the effect of non-bank blockholders since the coefficient of the interaction term between CONCENT and EQBANK remains insignificant.
In unreported further regressions we varied the applied bootstrap procedure (we used the percentile method and dispensed with the clustering adjustment), but none of these exercises changed our results.
Additional Robustness Tests
According to our results and the previous literature on carve-outs, more opaque firms before the event have higher abnormal returns. In the context of large conglomerate firms, our corresponding measure of opaqueness, the idiosyncratic risk component, can be problematic since business diversification of conglomerate firms may also lead to smaller idiosyncratic risk. This may offset in part the opaqueness effect. An alternative measure for opacity used in the literature is the dispersion of analysts forecasts.
27 Unfortunately, analysts forecasts based on IBES data are only available for a small subset of firms in our sample (23 out of 37). Unreported regressions show that for this subset of firms the effect of informational opaqueness is no longer significant. However, even in this case all results with respect to the ownership structure are unaffected.
27 Usually, however, reported results in the literature do not indicate large qualitative differences between the two proxies in applied work (see e.g. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) ).
Conclusions
Previous literature has established that abnormal returns of equity carve-out announcements are affected by the issue of managerial discretion (see e.g. Allen and McConnell (1998) ). In this paper, we adopt the view that agency problems like managerial discretion will be reflected in the market value adjustments following carve-out announcements. Our primary conjecture is, however, that the degree by which managerial discretion affects abnormal returns of carve-outs crucially depends on the pre-event control structure of the conglomerate firm.
We test this hypothesis for German carve-outs because the bank-based financial system of Germany allows to examine and compare the impact of different governance institutions; in particular blockholders and banks.
Our main result is that a higher degree of pre-event shareholder concentration, or the existence of an ultimate owner of a firm, leads to lower abnormal returns.
Clearly, the governance structure affects firm valuation. The negative relationship implies that weaker control of management leads to less efficiently managed firms.
Abnormal returns at the announcement are higher for firms with a less disciplined management because these firms can benefit the most.
Finally, we do not find evidence consistent with a "special" role of banks in disciplining management, although we explicitly take into account equity holdings, proxy-votes and supervisory board representation of banks. Banks do exert management control as a direct shareholder, but their impact does not differ from that of non-financial investors.
A Bootstrap Procedure
The basic concept of bootstrapping is to generate information on an unknown probability distribution F from an observed random sample x with size n of this distribution.
28 If the observations of the random sample are independent and identically distributed, one can generate new identically distributed samples by drawing a random sample with replacement from the original sample, x * .
Repeating this procedure many times leads to many so-called bootstrap-samples.
Usually, one is interested in some statistic θ of the population with the estimateθ(x) from the original sample x. Now, given that random resampling with replacement preserves the empirical informationF on the population distribution F , one can calculate the statisticθ(x * ) for each of the bootstrap-sample, the so called bootstrap replications. Then the standard error of the estimatedθ can be inferred from the empirical (bootstrap) distribution ofθ(x * ). The same principle applies if a probability model rather than a single distribution is under consideration, one just has to take care not to destroy this relationship when resampling.
In the context of the carve-out analysis, we're interested in inference on regression parameters. Random resampling then occurs jointly for the vector of dependent variable observations y and the associated information matrix x, without destroying the association between the two. A bootstrap replicate is the (repeatedly calculated) estimate of the regression parameters based on the bootstrap samples. Inference will be based on confidence intervals. One possibility for this is the so-called percentile-method, which basically orders the bootstrap estimates and uses the resulting empirical distribution (around the initial sample estimate) to construct the confidence limits for a given coverage probability. Alternatively, one can calculate in each bootstrap replication a t-value centered at the initial (consistent) sample estimate. Based on the resulting empirical t-distribution (specific for a given initial sample) the confidence interval is
where T * (b) denotes the t-value for the bootstrap replication b B, se * (b) is the bootstrap standard error of the replication b and B denotes the number of bootstrap replications. As indicated by (2), from the resulting distribution of T * values one can construct the confidence interval around the estimate of the initial sample statisticθ using a consistent sample (not bootstrap) standard error se. Note that α denotes the chosen coverage probability of the confidence interval andt * (.) the corresponding critical t-values (up and low) from the empirical t-distribution. This is the so-called bootstrap-t-method.
29
Now, the advantages of the bootstrap procedure are easily seen: Since inference is based only the empirical distribution of the statistic (here: t-values), one doesn't have to care for heteroscedasticity. Second, if the resampling with replacement is conducted by drawing blocks of correlated event observations with equal probability for each, inference is robust to event-clustering as well. Finally, as a side issue, since the t-value is a pivotal statistic, its (bootstrap) bias decreases faster with increasing sample size n as compared to an asymptotic statistic like the White(1980)-standard errors. That is, under some regularity conditions the confidence interval is more precise for a given number of observations (Horowitz (1999) , p.31).
As a robustness test for the validity of inference in our cross-sectional regressions, we construct bootstrap-t confidence intervals for each of the estimated coefficients. The procedure is as follows:
1. Draw a cluster-based bootstrap sample from the original sample with replacement, where the sample size is equal to the number of events.
2. Run the regression on the bootstrap sample and store the regression coefficients and respective t-values.
29 See Efron and Tibshirani (1993) , Chapter 12.
3. Repeat this procedure S times.
4. Calculate the confidence interval according to equation (2).
Step one is the most crucial since it adjusts the inference for event-clustering.
If a given event is drawn, generally all of the associated events within its cluster (and the respective information on the CAR and the explanatory variables) are put into the bootstrap sample. But if the respective cluster contains more than one event, a second random draw with as many possible realisations is drawn.
The full cluster enters the bootstrap sample for just one of these realisations, for the others the complete draw is repeated. This procedure ensures putting equal probability on any event of the initial sample, rather than on any cluster. 
B Sample Overview
